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2026/0356(COD) · COM(2026) 1100 · regulation · proposed 11 November 2026 · Environment, consumers and health

Promoting fair business-to-consumer commercial practices in the offline and digital single market, and repealing Directive 2005/29/EC (Digital Fairness Act)

Commission impact assessment: yes · Legal basis: TFEU 114 · Proposal on EUR-Lex

Neutral
5/10
Medium
Increase
Questionable
Medium

Medium divergence among member states, based on 9 of 27 countries with country-specific evidence.

In brief

The Digital Fairness Act would replace the existing Unfair Commercial Practices Directive with a regulation that applies directly in all member states. It adds rules on dark patterns (interface designs that push consumers toward choices they did not intend), influencer marketing, loot boxes, and digital subscriptions. The verdict is neutral: members gain a single cross-border rulebook roughly equal in value to the national room they give up, and the overall risk to the coupling is moderate, at 5 out of 10.

The exchange

Members give up steering in an area where they could previously act freely. Binding limits now apply to national measures against unfair commercial practices, and further national obligations are barred unless the regulation allows them. The Commission gains enforcement powers, including fines of up to 6% of worldwide turnover for widespread cross-border infringements, and the power to update the lists of banned dark patterns and addictive features. Because the instrument is a regulation, national transposition choices disappear.

In return, members gain a coupling benefit, meaning what they gain together that they could not gain alone. The main gain is a single rulebook for cross-border digital commerce in place of 27 national regimes. The Commission estimates recurrent business costs of EUR 678 million a year after overlap adjustment, against a yearly consumer detriment reduction of EUR 13.7 billion. These are the Commission's own modelled figures, and the detriment estimate rests on contested assumptions.

Three points decide the verdict. The competence transfer is real, through binding limits and new Commission powers. The joint enforcement capacity is substantial but depends on a companion instrument not yet adopted, so the benefit is rated medium rather than high. And the fit with subsidiarity, the principle that action belongs at EU level only where it works better than at national level, is questionable for minors and spending-related practices. A uniform EU ceiling there removes room for stricter national choices.

Where member states differ

Divergence from the EU-level verdict is medium, based on nine countries with country-specific research. The main source is existing national protection. Belgium and Spain are negative. Belgium treats paid loot boxes as games of chance requiring a permit and has adopted or is considering rules on spending-maximising features for minors. Spain has pending proposals to restrict minors' access to paid items with uncertainty-based rewards and to restrict ticket resale, both of which a common ceiling would pre-empt. Poland is also negative, because its planned restrictions on loot boxes under gambling law would be constrained. The Netherlands is positive, since its existing cancellation and free-trial rules already resemble the new reminder and termination duties, and the single rulebook would replace national renewal rules. Germany, Denmark, Finland, France and Ireland are neutral, with their gains and losses broadly offsetting.

Seventeen countries without country-specific evidence take the EU-level verdict; this reflects a gap in the evidence, not a finding about them. One member's result was unstable across the assessment, so no score is reported for it.

What to watch

The main risk is over-steering in the minors and spending domains. Members with stricter rules may treat the regulation as a ceiling and resist it. Uneven use of the Commission's enforcement role could weaken its legitimacy if members see it act in some cases and not others. Compliance costs fall heavily on small and medium-sized businesses, which the Commission's impact assessment says face an initial burden. Non-EU traders present a further risk that the bill addresses only through enforcement tools not yet in place.

The verdict would change in several ways. Adoption of the companion enforcement instrument would strengthen the joint capacity and could raise the coupling benefit. Narrower minors' provisions or wider derogations would reduce over-steering and could improve the subsidiarity fit. Conversely, a weaker enforcement framework or a sharper burden on smaller businesses would push the balance toward a negative verdict.

Member states

A country without country-specific evidence takes the EU verdict (shown faded and marked ◦); that is not a finding about it. Not applicable means the country does not take part in the act. All terms explained.

AT ◦ Austria
Neutral
BE Belgium
Negative
BG ◦ Bulgaria
Neutral
CY ◦ Cyprus
Neutral
CZ ◦ Czechia
Neutral
DE Germany
Neutral
DK Denmark
Neutral
EE ◦ Estonia
Neutral
EL ◦ Greece
Neutral
ES Spain
Negative
FI Finland
Neutral
FR France
Neutral
HR ◦ Croatia
Neutral
HU ◦ Hungary
Neutral
IE Ireland
Neutral
IT ? Italy
no stable result
LT ◦ Lithuania
Neutral
LU ◦ Luxembourg
Neutral
LV ◦ Latvia
Neutral
MT ◦ Malta
Neutral
NL Netherlands
Positive
PL Poland
Negative
PT ◦ Portugal
Neutral
RO ◦ Romania
Neutral
SE ◦ Sweden
Neutral
SI ◦ Slovenia
Neutral
SK ◦ Slovakia
Neutral

Where countries differ, and why

Belgium Negative

Belgium already treats paid loot boxes as games of chance that need a permit, and it has adopted or is considering rules on spending-maximising features to protect minors12. Recital 11 and the minors' ceiling ind1 would therefore remove a stricter national position, so Belgium gives up more than a typical member. The single rulebook still helps cross-border sellersd3, but the loss on minors' protection outweighs it for Belgium.

From the Commission’s impact assessment:
  1. “For example, Belgium, Germany, Spain and Poland have already adopted or are considering regulation of certain spending-maximising features, i.e. loot boxes, in their gambling laws or to ensure the health and safety of minors.”
  2. “In 2018, the Belgian Gambling Commission reached the conclusion that paid loot boxes fulfil the definition of ‘games of chance’ under Belgian gambling law and that offering them without a permit is illegal.”
  3. “Belgium has banned habitual (professional) resale and occasional (consumer) resale above the face value.”
  4. “In Belgium, consumers can cancel a tacitly renewed subscription with a maximum two-month notice.”
  5. “Belgium 328 , France 329 and Italy 330 have introduced rules requiring a reminder before auto-renewal of a contract, with different terms: 15 days, 1-3 months and 30 days, respectively.”
Germany Neutral

Germany's 2021 Youth Protection Act already sets age ratings and sales limits for games with gambling-like elements4, which the minors' ceiling ind1 would constrain. German courts also read the transactional decision test more narrowly than the Commission's guidance5, so the broader reading may add compliance work. Against this, German online retailers report large revenue losses to non-compliant third-country marketplaces2, which the shared enforcement capacity could help address, so the overall exchange stays neutral.

From the Commission’s impact assessment:
  1. “A 2022 study on German gamers aged 16 and above reported that approximately 31% of gamers indicated that they had spent more than they had intended on at least one occasion.”
  2. “A 2026 study by a German industry association estimated that German online retailers lose EUR 2.5 billion in direct revenue to third country online marketplaces, which have been found not to comply with EU laws in the past.”
  3. “Member States such as the Netherlands, Germany, Belgium, France and Italy have adopted specific rules on automated renewal clauses and subscription termination”
  4. “In 2021, Germany adopted a Youth Protection Act, that imposes an age rating and labelling requirement on video games that contain gambling-like elements and prohibits their sale below the indicated age.”
  5. “while German courts have taken a narrower view”
  6. “Germany introduced a two-click subscription cancellation process requiring a cancellation button.”
Denmark Neutral

Denmark already bans ticket resale above the original price2, so the ticket transparency and resale-related rules in the proposal are unlikely to change much for it. The evidence on Denmark is limited, and no input points to a difference in its minors' or subscription rules from the typical member. Its position therefore stays at the EU-level verdictd3.

From the Commission’s impact assessment:
  1. “ticket resale is restricted by national rules in some Member States (Belgium, Denmark, France, Italy and Ireland)”
  2. “Denmark has banned resale above the original price.”
Spain Negative

Spain has pending proposals to restrict minors' access to paid items with uncertainty-based rewards and to restrict ticket resale, and a common EU ceiling would pre-empt both35d1. Its Spanish-language influencer disclosure requirement would also need to be reconciled with the common rules4d2. Because these national measures are still at proposal stage, Spain gives up more policy room than a typical member without gaining a clearly larger joint capacity in return.

From the Commission’s impact assessment:
  1. “Belgium, Germany, Spain and Poland have already adopted or are considering regulation of certain spending-maximising features, i.e. loot boxes, in their gambling laws or to ensure the health and safety of minors.”
  2. “such measures have been proposed also in Spain”
  3. “A legislative proposal in Spain foresees the restriction of access to paid items with uncertainty-based rewards containing exchangeable items for minors under the age of 18.”
  4. “Spain also requires clear disclosure labels in Spanish”
  5. “A legislative proposal in Spain envisages similar measures.”
Finland Neutral

Finland has its own influencer marketing guidance that recommends the term "advertisement" and treats vague tags as insufficient12. The influencer rules in the proposal may therefore require some adjustmentd2, but the inputs do not show that this exposure is large relative to a typical member. Finland's position matches the EU-level verdict.

From the Commission’s impact assessment:
  1. “Under consumer law, France, Belgium, Finland, or Ireland have adopted legislation or guidelines on influencer marketing, with varying approaches.”
  2. “Finland recommends terms such as "advertisement" while vague terms such as "received" or "PR" alone are deemed insufficient to convey the commercial purpose with enough clarity.”
France Neutral

France already requires specific French-language disclosure terms and treats tags such as #ad as non-compliant3, so influencer rules change the form of its requirements more than their substanced2. A 2024 study found dark patterns on all 20 analysed platforms1, which makes the common dark-pattern rules and the shared enforcement capacity more useful to France than to a typical member. Its existing three-click cancellation and two-click contract rules56 limit the new subscription friction, so its position matches the EU-level verdict.

From the Commission’s impact assessment:
  1. “A 2024 study by a national consumer organisation focusing on the most popular online platforms in France found dark patterns on all of the 20 analysed online marketplaces and accommodation booking platforms”
  2. “A recent study by a national business association indicates that 31% of French consumers who buy on the internet use generative AI.”
  3. “France requires terms such as "Publicité" or "Collaboration commerciale"; ambiguous tags such as #ad or #sponso are considered non-compliant.”
  4. “France has banned regular ticket resale without the authorisation of the event organiser.”
  5. “France introduced a three-click cancellation process for contracts that can be concluded online, requiring a cancellation facility to be available online.”
  6. “in France every contract needs to be validated through two clicks”
Ireland Neutral

Irish authorities investigated consumer complaints about event ticket price increases during booking1, which points to a pricing problem that the shared enforcement capacity could address. Ireland already bans ticket resale above face value3, and its influencer guidance is part of a varied national approach2, which may require some adjustmentd2. Taken together, these points leave Ireland close to the EU-level verdict.

From the Commission’s impact assessment:
  1. “with numerous consumer complaints about the excessive price increases during the booking process and subsequent investigations by the authorities in the UK and Ireland”
  2. “Member States such as France, 323 Finland and Ireland 324 have adopted national legislation or guidelines under consumer law on this topic.”
  3. “Ireland has banned the resale above face value.”
Netherlands Positive

The Netherlands already allows tacitly renewed subscriptions to be cancelled with one month's notice3 and already requires a reminder and consumer confirmation before a free trial converts to a paid subscription4. The new reminder and termination duties therefore add little new friction for it, and the single rulebook would replace national rules on renewal and cancellation2. Its position is more favourable than a typical member's, although the ticket resale problem it reports1 is not decisive here.

From the Commission’s impact assessment:
  1. “in the Netherlands in 2023, 8.2 % of event tickets were resold of which 12.4% at higher price, with the average price mark-up of 65.8% and maximum of 266%.”
  2. “Member States such as the Netherlands, Germany, Belgium, France and Italy have adopted specific rules on automated renewal clauses and subscription termination, differing on aspects such as the technical solutions and deadlines prescribed.”
  3. “In the Netherlands consumers can cancel tacitly renewed subscriptions with a one‑month notice.”
  4. “In the Netherlands there is also an obligation for the trader to send a reminder and to receive a confirmation that the consumer agrees to the conversion of a free trial to a paid subscription.”
Poland Negative

Poland's position differs from the EU verdict mainly on loot boxes. Poland is considering restricting them as games of chance under national gambling law, and the bill's rules on loot boxes and pay-to-win mechanisms, with restrictions for minors, would constrain that option once the regulation applies12d1. The impact assessment's evidence concerns a measure still under consideration rather than one adopted, so the loss is of a planned national option rather than of an existing rule. Poland's compliance burden and its share of the single rulebook gain are not shown to differ from a typical member, so the friction and joint-capacity readings stay as they are.

From the Commission’s impact assessment:
  1. “Poland is considering the introduction of similar measures by classifying loot boxes as games of chance.”
  2. “Belgium, Germany, Spain and Poland have already adopted or are considering regulation of certain spending-maximising features”

17 countries take the EU verdict for lack of country-specific evidence.

National parliaments

No reasoned opinion or contribution listed yet. Silence is not approval: parliaments have eight weeks or more to react.

Full EU-level analysis

What the bill does

The proposal converts the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive (2005/29/EC) into a regulation, so it applies directly in all members without transposition (recital 5, Art. 38(1)). It keeps the existing general prohibition, the misleading and aggressive practice rules and Annex I, and adds digital-specific rules. These cover dark patterns, with a general prohibition and a list of practices banned in all circumstances (Art. 10, Annex I Part III). They also cover influencer marketing (Art. 11), personalised advertising and pricing that targets minors or vulnerable consumers (Arts. 12–13), virtual currencies, loot boxes and pay-to-win mechanisms with restrictions for minors (Arts. 14–16), user-controlled switching off of addictive features (Art. 17), event ticket and virtual queue transparency (Arts. 18–19), and digital subscriptions and automated contracting (Arts. 20–27). Traders bear the obligations. Enforcement runs through national authorities, with a new Commission role for widespread infringements with a Union dimension, including fines of up to 6% of worldwide turnover (Arts. 30(4), 35(6)). The Commission also gets delegated powers to update the dark pattern list and the addictive-feature list (Arts. 10(3), 17(2)). Full harmonisation is stated as the aim (recital 11). Derogations remain for financial services, immovable property, door-to-door sales and health or taste rules (Art. 2(4), (8); recital 12).

What members give up

Members give up steering in a field where they could previously act freely. Binding conditions now apply to national measures against unfair commercial practices, and recital 11 bars further obligations unless the regulation allows them. This matters most for minors. Members that already protect children more strongly than the regulation will have to reduce that protection, or rely on the narrow derogations. The Commission gains enforcement and delegated-act powers over the listed practices (Arts. 10(3), 17(2), 30(4)). The Commission's own account of the new CPC enforcement role depends on a separate instrument that is not yet adopted, so the centre's added reach is real in the text but partly conditional. The act type sharpens the loss: a regulation leaves no national correlator between EU rule and trader, and national transposition choices disappear.

What members get back

The main return is a single rulebook for cross-border digital commerce in place of 27 transposed regimes, with less scope for divergent interpretation (Art. 38(1); recital 6; IA summary). This lowers fragmentation friction for traders selling across borders. The Commission estimates recurrent business costs of EUR 678 million a year after overlap adjustment, against a yearly consumer detriment reduction of EUR 13.7 billion, though these are its own modelled figures and the detriment estimates rest on contested assumptions. The simplification measures (Art. 27 and the separate simplification directive) reduce some information duties, but this is a small part of the package. The joint capacity gained is mostly a shared enforcement capacity, pooled through the Commission for cross-border cases, and its strength depends on the companion CPC proposal. Net friction is therefore not clearly lower. Members gain a coherent rule for cross-border digital practices, but compliance, familiarisation and new reminder and termination duties add friction for traders, and enforcement costs are small (EUR 5–8 million a year across the EU, according to the IA summary).

Subsidiarity and heterogeneity

The cross-border case for harmonising digital commerce rules is strong: the practices are offered across the single market and the Commission's evidence on fragmentation is persuasive. The fit is weaker for minors and gambling-adjacent products. Exposure and the preferences of members differ here, and a uniform EU ceiling removes room for stricter national choices. The bill leaves some room through its derogations, but not for digital practices aimed at minors, where members' prior protection levels vary and where the full-harmonisation clause removes the option of going further. The IA summary reports that members and stakeholders broadly supported EU action, but the consultation was dominated by consumer and child-protection voices, and business support was lower.

Risks to the coupling

The main risk is over-steering in the minors and spending domains. Members with stricter national rules may see the regulation as a ceiling and resist it. Uneven application of the Commission's enforcement role, and the delay in the companion CPC instrument, could weaken legitimacy if members see the centre acting in some cases and not in others. Business compliance costs are concentrated among SMEs, which the IA says face an initial burden. Non-compliance from non-EU traders is a further risk that the bill addresses only through enforcement tools not yet adopted.

Verdict

The exchange is roughly balanced, with a neutral overall score. The decisive points are these. The bill transfers real competence: binding limits on national measures and new Commission powers over enforcement and delegated updates. It returns a medium coupling benefit, namely a single rulebook for cross-border digital commerce, which is substantial but not clearly high because the joint enforcement capacity depends on an instrument not yet adopted. The subsidiarity fit is questionable because full harmonisation on minors and spending-maximising practices may over-steer members with different starting points. The risk to the coupling is moderate, around 5.

Published 22 November 2026. Assessed once, at the Commission proposal; later amendments are not re-assessed. Methodology.